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Freeport, Texas is a small city situated near the confluence of the
Brazos River and the Gulf of Mexico.1  Home to a large and thriv-
ing port,2 the city itself has been in a period of decline for several
decades.3  In an attempt to reverse this trend, the City Council
hired the Maritime Trust Company, a consulting firm, to evaluate
the economic status and prospects of the city, and, if necessary, to
make recommendations for revitalization.4  The resulting report
highlighted the lack of commercial and retail establishments in
downtown Freeport and the excessive vacancy rate and disrepair of
downtown buildings.  The report concluded that the area was in a
general state of decline that would require government interven-
tion to reverse.5  Ultimately, the report recommended that the City
undertake a planned effort to revitalize the downtown area around
a marina, concluding that development of a large, mixed-use ma-
rina was “probably the single most important development that can
bring significant economic stimulus to the city.”6  Following the re-
port’s recommendations, the City and the Freeport Economic De-
* Leroy G. Denman, Jr., Regents Professor in Real Property Law, The Univer-
sity of Texas School of Law.  The author would like to thank Tad Duree, Eliot Turner,
and Eric Willis for their extremely helpful research assistance on this project.
1. The Ultimate Guide To Freeport, http://www.texasexplorer.net/Freeport.htm
(last visited Mar. 25, 2007).
2. In a recent press release, Port Freeport claimed to have a $9 billion impact on
the Texas economy and provide more than 11,000 jobs in Brazoria County. See Press
Release, Port Freeport, Port Freeport is $9 Billion Economic Engine Directly Respon-
sible for 11,131 Jobs (Sept. 13, 2006) (on file with author).
3. See Nancy Sarnoff, Freeport Shakes Shadow of Dow, HOUS. BUS. J., Feb. 21,
2003 (“After years of economic decline brought on by business flight and a blighted
environmental image, the city of Freeport is plotting an ambitious course for the fu-
ture in an attempt to erase the past.”); see generally Master Plan for the Downtown
Study Core Area for the City of Freeport, Texas (Oct. 2002) [hereinafter Freeport
Master Plan].
4. See Freeport Master Plan, supra note 3, at 3. R
5. See id. at 10 (noting that thirty-one percent of the land uses in the study area
are residential uses and, of these, twenty-three percent are vacant and ninety-seven
percent are either severely or moderately blighted).
6. Western Seafood Co. v. United States, No. 04-41196, 2006 WL 2920809, at *1
(5th Cir. Oct. 11, 2006) (citing the Freeport Master Plan, supra note 3).
657
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velopment Council (“FEDC”) entered into an agreement with
Freeport Marina LP, a private company, to develop and operate a
large mixed-use marina on the banks of the Old Brazos River.7
The agreement called for extensive public investment in the pro-
ject, by means of low interest loans combined with substantial pri-
vate investment by Freeport Marina.8  The FEDC estimated that
the marina would attract $60 million worth of hotels, restaurants,
and retail establishments to the City’s downtown area and create
between 150 and 250 new jobs.9
Plans to develop the marina proceeded uneventfully, with the
FEDC purchasing property designated in the development plan
from private landowners.  When the FEDC sought to purchase two
seafood processing properties located on land crucial to the devel-
opment, however, the owners of both operations objected.10  Ulti-
mately, Western Seafood Company sued the FEDC, arguing,
among other things, that the planned marina did not constitute a
valid public use, and that, therefore, the FEDC lacked constitu-
tional authority to exercise eminent domain powers for this pro-
ject.11  The district court rejected Western Seafood’s claims,
concluding that the Public Use Clause of the Constitution was to
be broadly interpreted with a particular deference to legislative
judgments, and that Freeport’s redevelopment plan clearly sur-
vived this deferential review.12
Western Seafood appealed, and while its appeal was pending,
two important events transpired.  First, the Supreme Court decided
Kelo v. City of New London,13 in which it reaffirmed the cases that
formed the basis of the district court decision in Western Seafood.14
In particular, the Supreme Court held that the public use limitation
7. Western Seafood Co. v. City of Freeport, 346 F. Supp. 2d 892, 894 (S.D. Tex.
2004).
8. See City of Freeport, Marina News, http://www.freeport.tx.us/Marina_News.
htm (last visited Mar. 25, 2007) (describing the $6 million loan); see also Velda
Hunter, Freeport OKs Loan for Trico Move, FACTS, Sept. 14, 2006 (detailing an addi-
tional $300,000 interest-free loan).
9. Thayer Evans, Freeport Moves to Seize Three Properties, HOUS. CHRON., June
24, 2005, at A6.
10. Id.
11. The other objecting company, Trico Seafood Company, has recently entered
into an agreement with the FEDC, under which the Council agreed to pay up to
$300,000 to relocate the operation from its current sight to a new location on the Old
Brazos River.  The Council will obtain the money to fund the relocation through a
low-interest loan from the City. See Hunter, supra note 8. R
12. Western Seafood, 346 F. Supp. 2d at 892.
13. 545 U.S. 469 (2005).
14. See id. at 481-82.
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on the exercise of eminent domain requires only that the state es-
tablish that its use of the property will serve a public purpose, that
economic development was a legitimate public purpose, and that
legislative determinations regarding the public benefit offered by a
proposed project are generally entitled to substantial judicial defer-
ence.15  Second, as happened in many other states, the Texas legis-
lature responded to Kelo by adopting a statute, The Limitations on
the Use of Eminent Domain Act (the “Act”), limiting the use of
eminent domain for economic redevelopment.16  Thus, when the
Fifth Circuit addressed Western Seafood’s claims, it recognized
that the district court had correctly rejected the federal constitu-
tional claim, as Kelo had made clear, but that the court’s interpre-
tation of the state constitutional claim might be affected by the
subsequent passage of the Act.17  Accordingly, the Fifth Circuit re-
manded the case to the district court to resolve the state claim in
light of the new statute.18
This scenario—an ongoing urban revitalization project arrested
by legislative responses to the Kelo decision—is likely to play out
in many cities and towns across the country in the next few years.19
Since Kelo was decided, thirty-four states have adopted some re-
sponsive legislation or constitutional amendment.20  These new
15. See id. at 482.
16. The Limitations on the Use of Eminent Domain Act, S.B. 7, 79th Leg., 2d
Sess. (Tex. 2005) (adopted August 10, 2005, significantly constraining the authority of
government actors to use eminent domain for economic development purposes).
17. The Fifth Circuit pointed out that state courts in Texas interpret the Texas
Constitution by reference to relevant legislative pronouncements, even subsequent
ones.  Western Seafood Co. v. United States, No. 04-41196, 2006 WL 2920809, at *13
(5th Cir. Oct. 11, 2006).  Thus, a pre-existing constitutional provision might be inter-
preted differently in light of a subsequent statute speaking to the same issue.
18. Id. at *6.
19. In fact in June 2006, a Florida state court upheld a landowner’s challenge to
the exercise of eminent domain over its downtown property as part of a planned ho-
tel, condominium, and retail complex undertaken by the city of Hollywood and a
private developer. See John Holland, Hollywood Can’t Seize Family Land, Judge
Rules, S. FLA. SUN-SENTINEL, June 23, 2006 at 1A.  The ruling was based on Florida’s
legislative response to Kelo limiting the use of eminent domain for economic develop-
ment. See id.
20. Prior to November 7, 2006, thirty-one states had enacted post-Kelo eminent
domain reform legislation. See H.B. 654, Reg. Sess., 2006 Ala. Laws 584; H.B. 318,
24th Leg., 2d Reg. Sess., 2006 Alaska Sess. Laws 84; H.B. 2675, 47th Leg., 2d Reg.
Sess. (Ariz. 2006); S.B. 1809, 2005-2006 Reg. Sess., 2006 Cal. Stat. 603; H.B. 1411, 65th
Gen. Assem., 2d Reg. Sess. (Colo. 2006); S.B. 217, 143d Gen. Assem. (Del. 2005);
H.B. 1567, 19th Leg., 2d Reg. Sess., 2006 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. Ch. 2006-11 (West);
H.J.R. 1569, 180th Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2006); H.B. 1313, Reg. Sess., 2006 Ga. Laws 444;
H.R. 1306, Reg. Sess., 2006 Ga. Laws 445; H.B. 555, 59th Leg., 2d Reg. Sess., 2006
Idaho Sess. Laws 96; S.B. 3086, 94th Gen. Assem., 2006 Ill. Legis. Serv. 94-1055
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laws, to varying degrees and using various mechanisms, limit the
power of state and local governments to use eminent domain to
facilitate economic redevelopment projects.  This Article explores
the reach of these statutes and their likely consequences for ongo-
ing and future urban revitalization projects.  Part II of the Article
explores the problems inherent in attempting to craft a judicially
enforceable public use limitation for the exercise of eminent do-
main and the Supreme Court’s response to that dilemma, culminat-
ing with its recent decision in Kelo.  Part III explores and analyzes
the impressively swift and extensive legislative responses to the
Kelo decision among the states.  Part IV evaluates the urban revi-
talization movement leading up to Kelo and the importance of the
use of eminent domain to the success of a comprehensive urban
(West); H.B. 1010, 114th Gen. Assem, 2d Reg. Sess. (Ind. 2006); H.F. 2351, 81st Gen.
Assem, 2d Reg. Sess. (Iowa 2006); S.B. 323, Reg. Sess., 2006 Kan. Sess. Laws 192;
H.B. 508, 2006 Reg. Sess., 2006 Ky. Acts 73; S.B. 1, Reg. Sess., 2006 La. Acts 851; H.B.
707, Reg. Sess., 2006 La. Acts 859; H.P. 1310, 122nd Leg., 2d Reg. Sess., 2006 Me.
Laws 579; S.J. Res. E, 93d Leg., Reg. Sess. (Mich. 2005); S.F. 2750, 84th Leg., Reg.
Sess., 2006 Minn. Laws 214; H.B. 1944, 93d Gen. Assem., 2d Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2006);
L.B. 924, 99th Leg., 2d Reg. Sess.  (Neb. 2006); S.B. 287, 159th Sess., 2006 N.H. Laws
324; H.B. 746, 47th Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.M. 2006); H.B. 1965, Gen. Assem., 1st Sess.,
2005 N.C. Sess. Laws 2006-224; S.B. 167, 126th Gen. Assem. (Ohio 2005; S.B. 881,
199th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess., 2006 Pa. Laws 2006-35; Rat. 453, Gen. Assem., 116th
Sess. (S.C. 2006); H.B. 1080, 81st Leg. Assem.: Reg. Sess., 2006 S.D. Sess. Laws 66;
S.B. 3296, 104th Gen. Assem., 2006 Tenn. Pub. Acts 863; S.B. 7, 79th Leg., 2d Sess.
(Tex. 2005); S.B. 184, 56th Leg., 2005 Utah Laws 292; S.B. 117 (Utah 2006); S. 246,
68th Biennial Sess., 2006 Vt. Acts & Resolves 111; H.B. 4048, 2006 W. Va. Acts 96;
A.B. 657, 2005-2006 Biennial Sess., 2006 Wis. Sess. Laws 233.
On or about November 7, 2006, voters in ten states ratified constitutional amend-
ments or ballot initiatives addressing eminent domain issues in response to Kelo.
Louisiana ratified a constitutional amendment on September 30, 2006, while nine
other states adopted or ratified constitutional amendments or ballot initiatives on No-
vember 7, 2006. See FLA. CONST. amend. VIII; GA. CONST. amend. I; LA. CONST.
amend. V; S.C. CONST. amend. V; Ariz. Prposition 207, Arizona Official Canvass at
16, available at http://www.azsos.gov/election/2006/General/Canvass2006.GE.pdf (last
visited Apr. 6, 2007); Mich. Proposal 06-04, Mich. Dep’t of State, available at, http://
miboecfr.nictusa.com/election/results/06GEN/90000004.html (last visited Apr. 6,
2007); Nev. Question 2, State of Nevada, 2006 Official Statewide General Election
Results, available at http://www.sos.state.nv.us/nvelection12006StatewideGeneral/
ElectionSummary.htm; N.H. Question 1, N.H. Elections Div., State General Election-
Nov. 7, 2006, available at http://www.sos.nh.gov/general 2006/sum-chesconcon06.html
(last visited Apr. 6, 2007); N.D. Measure 2, N.D. Sec’y of State, available at http://
web.apps.state.nd.us/sec/emspublic/gp/electionresultssearch.htm (select “General
Election-November 07, 2006” hyperlink; then select “Initiated Constitutional Mea-
sure No. 2”) (last visited Apr. 6, 2007); Or. Measure 39, November 7, 2006, General
Election Abstracts of Votes, Or. Sec’y of State, available at http://www.sos.state.or.us/
elections/nov72006/results/m39.pdf (last visited Apr. 6, 2007).  Because there is some
overlap between these two lists (i.e. some states have both legislative and constitu-
tional reactions to Kelo), the total number of states that have adopted post-Kelo emi-
nent domain reforms is thirty-four.
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revitalization plan.  Finally, Part V evaluates the consequences of
those state reactions to Kelo for the continued viability of urban
revitalization initiatives.  This section concludes that such initia-
tives are likely to continue essentially unabated, but that as a result
of these legislative responses they will necessarily be constructed in
a less efficient manner and will almost certainly have distressingly
disproportionate impacts on poor minority communities, much like
the now-discredited urban renewal projects of the past.
II. THE PROBLEM OF PUBLIC USE: A BRIEF HISTORY
AND KELO
Much has been written of the United States Supreme Court’s
inability or unwillingness to craft a meaningful public use limitation
on the Takings Clause.21  The Fifth Amendment to the United
States Constitution states: “nor shall private property be taken for
public use without just compensation.”22  While it is not self-evi-
dent that the “Public Use” Clause in this Amendment is actually a
constraint (it is sometimes suggested that it is merely a description
of the particular type of eminent domain for which compensation is
required),23 most scholars assume it is a limiting clause and the
Court has consistently treated it as such.24  The extent of the limit,
however, is unclear.
The easy cases of public use entail the condemnation of private
property for government ownership of public infrastructure, such
as roads, schools, and government buildings.25  The inquiry is made
more difficult, however, when the use to which the government
wishes to put the property entails private ownership.  Some such
cases are still rather obviously valid public uses; for example, the
provision of essential public infrastructure by highly regulated pri-
vate entities, such as railroads and utility companies.  Since such
uses are essentially “open to the public” and highly regulated, most
theories of public use readily encompass them.26  In contrast, if the
21. See, e.g., Thomas Merrill, The Economics of Public Use, 72 CORNELL L. REV.
61, 61-64 (1986); Jed Rubenfeld, Usings, 102 YALE L.J. 1077, 1078-79 (1993).
22. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
23. See, e.g., Rubenfeld, supra note 21, at 1081 (outlining this reading of the Public R
Use Clause).
24. The issue in Kelo was how much of a limit the clause imposes and which
branch is best suited to enforce the limit. See Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S.
469, 478-80 (2005).
25. See James E. Krier & Christopher Serkin, Public Ruses, 2004 MICH. ST. L.
REV. 859, 861.
26. See id.
\\server05\productn\F\FUJ\34-2\FUJ203.txt unknown Seq: 6 31-MAY-07 9:39
662 FORDHAM URB. L.J. [Vol. XXXIV
government proposes to condemn property solely for the purpose
of transferring it from one landowner to another, to be put to
whatever use the second landowner wishes, such a transfer is rather
clearly not for a public use.27  In between these two extremes, how-
ever, lies the public use dilemma.
The question of whether a particular use that falls within these
extremes constitutes a permissible public use or a prohibited pri-
vate benefit is both indeterminate and inextricably intertwined
with the traditional police powers of legislative bodies to act for the
public health, safety, and welfare.  As a consequence, scholars
troubled by the public use dilemma have generally attempted to
solve it by shifting the focus from the central question of what
counts as a public benefit to a proxy question designed to provide
judicially manageable standards for limiting impermissible takings
without treading on traditional legislative prerogatives.28
Jed Rubenfeld, for example, recommends adopting a “jurispru-
dence of usings,” which would focus not on the purported benefit
that would arise from a proposed project, but simply on the use to
which the condemned property would be put.29  Under his concep-
tion of the Public Use Clause, the compensation requirement
would apply only so long as the condemned property was actually
“used” by the government.30  Taking a dramatically different ap-
proach, Thomas Merrill argues that courts are unwilling or ill-
equipped to resolve the central question of what constitutes a valid
public use, and therefore should determine the means by which
government entities should acquire private property rather than
evaluate the ends to which the property will be put.31  Under this
approach, courts would focus on “where and how the government
should get property, not [on] what it may do with it.”32  Nicole
Garnett extends this argument, proposing that courts should apply
27. See id.; see also Kelo, 545 U.S. at 480.
28. See Merrill, supra note 21, at 64-65; Rubenfeld, supra note 21, at 1113. R
29. See Rubenfeld, supra note 21, at 1113. R
30. Compare the use of private property for an irrigation system with the nonuse
of cedar trees destroyed to avoid contamination of adjacent apple trees.  This concep-
tion of the public use clause would, somewhat controversially, create an entire cate-
gory of takings for which no compensation would be required. See id. at 1082-83.
31. Merrill, supra note 21, at 63-65. R
32. Id. at 66-67 (“The ends questions asks what the government plans to do once
the property is obtained.  This inquiry, in turn, requires a clear conception of the
legitimate functions or purposes of the state.  May the state promote employment by
subsidizing the construction of a privately owned factory?  May it own a professional
football team or undertake land reform?  The answers to such questions demand an
exercise in high political theory that most courts today are unwilling (or unable) to
undertake.”).
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a Nollan/Dolan type of essential nexus and rough proportionality
test to exercises of eminent domain power.33
While scholars have been struggling for theoretical clarity, courts
have been busy resolving public use challenges.  As John F. Hart’s
extensive chronicle of colonial era land use regulation makes clear,
land ownership in this country has long been subject to extensive
governmental control.34  Town leaders, tasked with facilitating the
development of entirely new, productive settlements, aggressively
managed the type and intensity of land use permitted on private
parcels.35  Regulations authorizing condemnation of private prop-
erty for the economic benefit of the community were extensive,
and private property was regularly transferred from one private
owner to another owner in order to facilitate construction of neces-
sary infrastructure that the town leaders felt would be better run by
private enterprise, such as mills and roads.36  Many of these land
use decisions were challenged as impermissible condemnations of
private property for the private benefit of another citizen.37
In response to these challenges, the Supreme Court has consist-
ently embraced a broad interpretation of the public use require-
ment, holding instead that the Fifth Amendment authorizes the use
of eminent domain in any project that is undertaken for the benefit
of the public, whether its actual use is open freely to the public or
not.38  Moreover, the Court has consistently deferred to legislative
determinations of what counts as a public benefit.39  This posture,
33. Nicole Stelle Garnett, The Public-Use Question as a Takings Problem, 71 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 934, 936-37 (2003).
34. John F. Hart, Colonial Land Use Law and its Significance for Modern Takings
Doctrine, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1252, 1259-81 (1996).
35. Id. at 1278-79 (explaining that private landowners were often obligated to put
their property to a particular use or have it taken from them to be put to that same
use by another private citizen).
36. Nathan Alexander Sales, Classical Republicanism and the Fifth Amendment’s
“Public Use” Requirement, 49 DUKE L.J. 339, 349 (1999) (chronicling the forced trans-
fer of private property from one citizen to another for the purpose of building mills
and private roads).
37. See, e.g., Strickley v. Highland Boy Gold Mining Co., 200 U.S. 527, 530-32
(1906); Fallbrook Irrigation Dist. v. Bradley, 164 U.S. 112 (1896).
38. See, e.g., Strickley, 200 U.S. at 531-32 (upholding the condemnation of a right-
of-way by a mining company for an aerial bucket line across a placer mining claim as
a valid public purpose); Clark v. Nash, 198 U.S. 361, 369 (1905) (holding that the
condemnation of land by an individual for the purpose of irrigating his own land con-
stituted a valid public purpose); Fallbrook Irrigation Dist., 164 U.S. at 160-63 (holding
that condemnation for the construction of an irrigation project to benefit privately
owned land constituted a public purpose).
39. See Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32 (1954) (“[W]hen the legislature has
spoken, the public interest has been declared in terms well-nigh conclusive.”).
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developed over the course of 150 years, was solidified in two cases
decided in the mid to late twentieth century—Berman v. Parker40
and Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff.41
The plaintiffs in Berman challenged the condemnation of their
profitable retail establishment for transfer to another private
owner.42  This condemnation was part of the first phase of the Dis-
trict of Columbia’s comprehensive urban renewal program, which
targeted Project Area B in the “Southwest Survey Area” for com-
plete revitalization.43  Although the District’s surveys indicated
that the area covered by Project Area B was significantly blighted,
some of the property was, like the plaintiffs’, being profitably used
in a productive manner.44  Nonetheless, the plan called for com-
plete revitalization, requiring the acquisition by purchase, gift, or
eminent domain of every parcel.45  Under the plan, some of the
property would be kept in public ownership and used for things
such as roads, schools, and parks.46  The rest would be allocated
according to the comprehensive plan to various forms of residential
and commercial use.47  This land would be resold to private owners
and developers to accomplish the purposes of the renewal plan.48
Berman objected to being forced to sell his profitable business to
the District merely to have the District transfer it to another pri-
vate landowner.49  The Supreme Court upheld the District’s au-
thority to use its power of eminent domain for this purpose,
however, stating grandly:
The concept of the public welfare is broad and inclusive.  The
values it represents are spiritual as well as physical, aesthetic as
well as monetary.  It is within the power of the legislature to
determine that the community should be beautiful as well as
healthy, spacious as well as clean, well-balanced as well as care-
fully patrolled.50
Moreover, the Court made it clear that legislative determinations
of public purpose were entitled to extraordinary deference:
40. 348 U.S. 26 (1954).
41. 467 U.S. 229 (1984).
42. Berman, 348 U.S. at 31.
43. Id. at 30.
44. Id. at 31.
45. Id. at 30-31.
46. Id. at 30.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 31.
50. Id. at 33 (citations omitted).
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Subject to specific constitutional limitations, when the legisla-
ture has spoken, the public interest has been declared in terms
well-nigh conclusive.  In such cases the legislature, not the judi-
ciary, is the main guardian of the public needs to be served by
social legislation, whether it be Congress legislating concerning
the District of Columbia or the States legislating concerning lo-
cal affairs.  This principle admits of no exception merely because
the power of eminent domain is involved.51
Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff involved an even more dra-
matic use of eminent domain, consisting entirely of the forced
transfer of private property from existing owners to other private
owners.52  The Hawaii Land Reform Act of 1967 authorized the
use of eminent domain to force landowners to sell their land in fee
simple to their lessees.53  According to the Hawaii legislature, the
forced sales were necessary to break up the oligopolistic land own-
ership patterns that had evolved in Hawaii since Polynesian settlers
had established feudal tenurial systems built around ownership by
High Chiefs.54  Midkiff objected to being forced to sell his real
property to his lessee, and again the Supreme Court rejected the
public use challenge.55  It held that:
The mere fact that property taken outright by eminent domain
is transferred in the first instance to private beneficiaries does
not condemn that taking as having only a private purpose.  The
Court long ago rejected any literal requirement that condemned
property be put into use for the general public . . . . The Act
advances its purposes without the State’s taking actual posses-
sion of the land.  In such cases, government does not itself have
to use property to legitimate the taking; it is only the taking’s
purpose, and not its mechanics, that must pass scrutiny under
the Public Use Clause.56
In addition, the Court reaffirmed the degree of deference owed
to legislative determinations of public benefit, pointing out that
“where the exercise of the eminent domain power is rationally re-
lated to a conceivable public purpose, the Court has never held a
compensated taking to be proscribed by the Public Use Clause.”57
51. Id. at 32 (citations omitted).
52. 467 U.S. 229, 233 (1984).
53. Id.
54. Id. at 231-33.
55. Id. at 233.
56. Id. at 243-44.
57. Id. at 241.
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The Midkiff decision was the Court’s determinative statement of
both the breadth of the Public Use Clause and the degree of defer-
ence to be accorded legislative determinations of public purpose
for more than twenty years.58  In light of its expansive holding, fed-
eral courts consistently rejected public use challenges to the exer-
cise of eminent domain between 1984 and 2004, until the Court
granted certiorari in Kelo.  In fact, as David Mathues reports in his
Note, “[a]ll reported federal appellate decisions between 1954 and
1986 in which the definition of ‘public use’ was contested upheld
the challenged use of eminent domain, as did thirteen out of the
fourteen reported appellate decisions on point between 1986 and
2003.”59
In contrast to the deferential posture of the federal courts, state
courts have generally been more willing to strike down attempts to
use eminent domain for economic development based on the pub-
lic use clauses of the relevant state constitutions.  Thomas Merrill
first observed this phenomenon in 1986 after surveying state and
federal cases in which an exercise of eminent domain was chal-
lenged on public use grounds.60  While his survey revealed that fed-
eral courts were faithfully adhering to the deferential standard of
review articulated in Berman, he was surprised to discover that
state courts were significantly less deferential in applying their own
constitution’s public use requirement.61  Indeed, his survey re-
vealed a trend of increasingly close scrutiny of public use claims in
successive five year periods between 1954 and 1984.62
Intensive state court scrutiny of the public use requirement has
continued to rise since Merrill conducted his survey.  In some
states, this heightened scrutiny is essentially distinct from the issue
addressed in Kelo, as the constitutions of these states make clear
that whether a proposed use of condemned property constitutes a
public use is a matter for judicial, not legislative, determination.63
58. G. David Mathues, Note, Shadow of a Bulldozer?: RLUIPA and Eminent Do-
main After Kelo, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1653, 1662 (2006).
59. Id.
60. See Merrill, supra note 21, at 95. R
61. Id. at 96.
62. See id. at 97 (“When we divide the survey cases into five-year periods, we find
that the total number of public use cases is fairly constant, ranging from 42 to 61 cases
in each period.  But the percentage of [state court] cases holding that a taking does
not serve a public use generally increases throughout the 31-year period.  The per-
centages are as follows: 1954-1960, 11.8%; 1961-1965, 12.5%; 1966-1970, 13.1%; 1971-
1975, 13.7%; 1976-1980, 21.4%; and 1980-1985, 20.4%.”).
63. Arizona, Colorado, Missouri, and Washington have such provisions in their
constitutions. ARIZ. CONST. art. II, § 17 (“Whenever an attempt is made to take pri-
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For example, Article I, Section 16 of the Washington Constitution
states that
[p]rivate property shall not be taken for private use . . . . When-
ever an attempt is made to take private property for a use al-
leged to be public, the question whether the contemplated use
be really public shall be a judicial question, and determined as
such, without regard to any legislative assertion that the use is
public.64
Notwithstanding this constitutional directive, the Washington Su-
preme Court has held that “a legislative declaration [of public use]
will be accorded great weight.”65  Ultimately, though, the degree of
scrutiny is significantly less deferential than that articulated under
Berman, Midkiff, and Kelo.66
But in cases in states with public use clauses similar to the fed-
eral clause and constitutional silence on the role of the judiciary in
reviewing public use questions, courts are nonetheless departing
from the Berman and Midkiff standards with what appears to be
increasing frequency.67  Perhaps the most noteworthy case is
County of Wayne v. Hathcock,68 in which the Michigan Supreme
Court overruled its notorious Poletown69 decision.  In Poletown,
the Michigan Supreme Court upheld Detroit’s plan to condemn
large parcels of private property and convey them to General Mo-
tors to build an assembly plant.70 Poletown is widely thought to be
the most extreme accommodation of legislative determination of
vate property for a use alleged to be public, the question whether the contemplated
use be really public shall be a judicial question, and determined as such without re-
gard to any legislative assertion that the use is public.”); COLO. CONST. art. II, § 15
(“[T]he question whether the contemplated use be really public shall be a judicial
question, and determined as such without regard to any legislative assertion that the
use is public.”); MO. CONST. art. I, § 28 (“[W]hen an attempt is made to take private
property for a use alleged to be public, the question whether the contemplated use be
public shall be judicially determined without regard to any legislative declaration that
the use is public.”); WASH. CONST. art. I, § 16.
64. WASH. CONST. art. I, § 16.
65. Des Moines v. Hemenway, 437 P.2d 171, 174 (Wash. 1968).
66. See, e.g., In re Petition of Seattle, 638 P.2d 549, 554-55 (Wash. 1981) (holding
that a proposed downtown revitalization project, while clearly in the public interest,
did not afford sufficient “public use” to satisfy the constitutional limitation).
67. For a discussion of this phenomenon, see Elizabeth F. Gallagher, Note, Break-
ing New Ground: Using Eminent Domain for Economic Development, 73 FORDHAM
L. REV. 1837, 1849-53 (2005) (citing state court cases that have applied more height-
ened scrutiny to the public use inquiry).
68. 684 N.W.2d 765 (Mich. 2004).
69. Poletown Neighborhood Council v. City of Detroit, 304 N.W.2d 455 (Mich.
1981).
70. Id. at 459-60.
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public benefit.71  In County of Wayne, the plaintiffs challenged the
condemnation of their residential property for the construction of a
privately-owned 1,300 acre business and technology park that had
the dual purpose of removing residential property from the over-
flight path of the expanded Wayne County airport and “re-
invigorat[ing] the struggling economy of southeastern Michigan.”72
The Michigan Supreme Court recognized that the proposed con-
demnations were within the statutory authority of the county,73 but
held that those statutory provisions were unconstitutional as ap-
plied in this case.74  Specifically, the court overruled Poletown and
significantly limited the use of eminent domain for economic devel-
opment.  In many of these cases, the courts have been particularly
concerned that the stated “public purpose” is actually pretextual,
and the condemnation is intended solely or primarily to benefit an
identified private entity.75  This concern is central to Justice Ken-
nedy’s concurrence in Kelo.76
When the Supreme Court granted certiorari in Kelo, proponents
of a more restrictive public use jurisprudence expressed guarded
hope that the Supreme Court was reconsidering its expansive
Berman and Midkiff pronouncements, and contemplating follow-
ing the lead of the state courts in restricting the use of eminent
domain for economic redevelopment, in part because Kelo
presented the Court with virtually the same public use challenge as
71. See Timothy Sandefur, A Gleeful Obituary for Poletown Neighborhood Coun-
cil v. Detroit, 28 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 651, 665 (2006).
72. County of Wayne, 684 N.W.2d at 769-70.
73. Id. at 776.
74. Id. at 788.
75. See, e.g., Southeastern Ill. Dev. Auth. v. Nat’l City Envtl. L.C.C., 768 N.E.2d 1,
10-11 (Ill. 2002) (invalidating a “quick-take” condemnation of private land for the
purpose of expanding the parking lot of an adjacent business, upon concluding that
“[w]e do not require a bright-line test to find that this taking bestows a purely private
benefit and lacks a showing of a supporting legislative purpose”); Casino Reinvest-
ment Dev. Auth. v. Banin, 727 A.2d 102, 111 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1998) (re-
jecting proposed condemnation of private land for transfer to casino developer to
hold for future development upon concluding that “the primary interest served here is
a private rather than a public one,” since the developer was unconstrained in his fu-
ture uses of the property).
76. See Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 490 (2005) (Kennedy, J., con-
curring).  Indeed, in the years leading up to Kelo, at least one lower federal court
rejected attempts to condemn private property for economic development on the
grounds that the public benefit was a pretext and that the purely private benefit was
the primary motive for the condemnation. See 99 Cents Only Stores v. Lancaster
Redevelopment Agency, 237 F. Supp. 2d 1123, 1131 (C.D. Cal. 2001) (noting that
“[i]n this case, the evidence is clear beyond dispute that Lancaster’s condemnation
efforts rest on nothing more than the desire to achieve the naked transfer of property
from one private party to another,” and invalidating the proposed condemnation).
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did Berman.77  In Kelo, the City of New London, an “economically
distressed city” with a high unemployment rate, sought to revitalize
an area of town left substantially underused when the federal gov-
ernment closed the Naval Undersea Warfare Center in the Fort
Trumball area.78  The comprehensive revitalization plan called for
the integrated redevelopment of ninety acres, which required the
New London Development Corporation to acquire all of the pri-
vately owned property within the plan’s boundaries.79  Kelo and
several of her neighbors owned residential property in this area.
The properties were neither blighted nor in poor condition, but
were subject to condemnation simply because they were located
within the area covered by the redevelopment plan.80  The plan
called for the transfer of their land to another private landowner
for redevelopment purposes, and the landowners objected.81
The Court’s decision in Kelo v. City of New London did not go as
far as property rights proponents hoped, however.82  In fact, the
Court relied heavily on Berman and Midkiff in rejecting Kelo’s
challenge to the condemnation of her property for a privately
owned revitalization project.83  The Court reaffirmed the principle
that “our public use jurisprudence has wisely eschewed rigid for-
mulas and intrusive scrutiny in favor of affording legislatures broad
latitude in determining what public needs justify the use of the tak-
ings power.”84  Property rights proponents were outraged, and the
public seemed to take notice of the broad power of eminent do-
main almost for the first time.85
Contrary to what has emerged as the conventional wisdom about
Kelo, however, the decision in fact significantly retreated from the
broad holdings in Berman and Midkiff.  As Justice O’Connor ob-
served in her Kelo dissent, the “errant language” of deference in
Berman is so sweeping as to admit of virtually no judicial oversight
77. See Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, The Uselessness of Public Use,
106 COLUM. L. REV. 1412, 1419 (2006) (“[A]t the time of the decision many takings
scholars and public figures expected (or hoped) that the Supreme Court would nar-
row down the definition of public use.”).
78. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 473 (majority opinion).
79. Id.
80. Id. at 475.
81. Id.
82. See Bell & Parchomovsky, supra note 77, at 1423-25 (detailing the disappoint- R
ment of commentators after Kelo).
83. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 480-82.
84. Id. at 483.
85. See, e.g., Bell & Parchomovsky, supra note 77, at 1418-19 (describing the “in- R
stant and near universal condemnation” that Kelo engendered).
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of legislative determinations of public purpose.86  The Kelo deci-
sion, in contrast, offers meaningful oversight of both the substance
and procedure of eminent domain actions for essentially the first
time.87
The procedural constraints articulated by the Kelo decision are
widely recognized.88  In upholding the City of New London’s deter-
mination that the condemnations were for the public benefit, the
Court relied on its observation that the planning process had been
comprehensive, transparent, and specifically authorized by state
statute.89  These procedural safeguards presumably set the stan-
dard for when the Court’s extraordinary deference to legislative
determinations is appropriate.
In addition to these procedural requirements, Kelo imposes a
substantive limitation on the use of eminent domain that may have
been dormant under Berman and Midkiff.90  According to the Kelo
Court, the Public Use Clause not only prohibits a government ac-
tor from taking the private property of one citizen for the personal
benefit of another, but also prohibits the taking of private property
under the pretext of public purposes when the actual purpose is to
bestow a private benefit.91  In his concurrence, Justice Kennedy
emphasized this substantive limitation, making clear that all the
process in the world will not insulate from judicial scrutiny “trans-
fers intended to confer benefits on particular, favored private enti-
ties, and with only incidental or pretextual public benefits.”92  A
plausible allegation of private benefit would warrant much more
rigorous scrutiny of the legislative determination than that articu-
lated in Berman and Midkiff.  Thus, notwithstanding public outcry
to the contrary, Kelo significantly reined in the expansive approach
to the public use inquiry that characterized Berman and Midkiff.
86. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 501 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
87. See id. at 483-84 (majority opinion) (emphasizing the careful planning process
that produced the revitalization plan at issue in Kelo), id. at 487 (recognizing that
“one-to-one transfers” outside of a careful planning context would call for more in-
tense judicial scrutiny of public purpose).
88. See David Schultz, What’s Yours Can Be Mine: Are There Any Private Takings
After Kelo v. City of New London, 24 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 195, 221-22 (2006)
(recognizing Kelo’s emphasis on the comprehensive planning process).
89. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 484.
90. Id. at 478 (emphasizing careful plan and lack of evidence of improper
purpose).
91. Id. at 477-78; see also id. at 491 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
92. Id. at 490 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
\\server05\productn\F\FUJ\34-2\FUJ203.txt unknown Seq: 15 31-MAY-07 9:39
2007] URBAN REVITALIZATION POST-KELO 671
III. STATE LEGISLATIVE RESPONSES TO KELO
Despite the Supreme Court’s retreat from the broad conception
of public use that had troubled property rights activists since
Midkiff, many scholars and much of the public appeared to per-
ceive it as a rubber-stamp of the Court’s prior views, and were re-
soundingly disappointed.93  Newspaper editorials decried the
taking of homes and business for the benefit of other private citi-
zens, and interest groups warned citizens that “your home could be
next.”94  The Kelo opinion itself acknowledges that the limited ef-
fectiveness of the Public Use Clause as a constraint on the use of
eminent domain for economic development purposes might be in-
consistent with popular sentiment about the wisdom of using emi-
nent domain for these purposes and invites legislative responses to
the Constitution’s forbearance.95
State legislators and citizens accepted the invitation extended by
the Kelo opinion.  With what might be record response time, public
outcry after Kelo led very quickly to legislative proposals to limit
the use of eminent domain for economic development.  By the end
of 2005, four state legislatures had enacted laws limiting the power
of its governing bodies to use eminent domain for economic devel-
opment,96 and a fifth legislature had approved a constitutional
amendment to appear on the November 2006 ballot.97  The outcry
did not dissipate with the passage of time, and by November 2006
an astonishing thirty-four states had passed legislation or adopted
constitutional amendments (or both) restricting the use of eminent
domain for economic development purposes.98  The pervasiveness
93. See, e.g., Charles E. Cohen, Eminent Domain After Kelo v. City of New
London: An Argument for Banning Economic Development Takings, 29 HARV. J.L. &
PUB. POL’Y 491 (2006); James W. Ely Jr., Property Rights and the Takings Clause:
Poor Relation Once More: The Supreme Court and the Vanishing Rights of Property
Owners, 2005 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 39 (2004/2005); Richard A. Epstein, The Public
Use, Public Trust & Public Benefit: Could Both Cooley and Kelo Be Wrong?, 9
GREEN BAG 2D 125 (2006).
94. See Larry Salzman & Alex Epstein, Commentary, Our Eminent Tyranny,
PROVIDENCE J., Feb. 23, 2005; John Tierney, Editorial, Your Land is My Land, N.Y.
TIMES, July 5, 2005, at A1.
95. See Kelo, 545 U.S. at 489 (majority opinion).
96. H.B. 654, Reg. Sess. (Ala. 2006); S.B. 217, 143d Gen. Assem. (Del. 2005); S.B.
167, 126th Gen. Assem. (Ohio 2005); S.B. 7, 79th Leg., 2d Sess. (Tex. 2005).
97. Michigan’s amendment, State Proposal 06-4, passed overwhelmingly on No-
vember 7, 2006, according to the Michigan Secretary of State’s unofficial election re-
sults. See Mich. Dep’t of State, Election Results (2006), http://miboecfr.nictusa.com/
election/results/06GEN/90000004.html (last visited Mar. 25, 2007).
98. See supra note 20 for a list of legislative enactments.  Louisiana ratified a con-
stitutional amendment on September 30, 2006, while nine other states adopted or
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of the response is all the more remarkable given that in five of the
non-responsive states the legislatures have not met in regular ses-
sion since June 2005.99
In light of the coherent and sustained public condemnation of
Kelo, it is not surprising that the legislative responses to the deci-
sion are strikingly similar.  The two dominant themes of the post-
Kelo eminent domain legislation are the protection of private land-
owners from the perceived overreaching of state and local govern-
ments by taking private property simply to put it to “better use” by
another private landowner, and the recognition that some privately
owned property is in such bad shape that condemnation—even for
use by another private party—is justified.  Much of the legislation
is aptly named to reflect the first theme;100 for example, Georgia
titled its post-Kelo legislation “The Landowner’s Bill of Rights and
Private Property Protection Act.”101  As a result of this focus, virtu-
ally every state that has enacted eminent domain reform in the
wake of Kelo has greatly restricted or entirely prohibited the use of
eminent domain to facilitate economic development, or has prohib-
ited the transfer of condemned property to private actors.102  Less
commonly, some states have responded to Kelo by adopting proce-
dural constraints intended to reduce the use of eminent domain for
these purposes.103  Still others have adopted moratoria on such
uses of eminent domain while their legislatures study the prob-
ratified constitutional amendments on November 7, 2006. See supra note 20 for a list
of constitutional amendments and ballot initiatives.  Some of these states had already
enacted legislation restricting the use of eminent domain.  These constitutional
amendments in some cases expanded upon the legislative enactments and in others
simply constitutionalized them.
99. The legislatures of Arkansas, Montana, Nevada, North Dakota, and Oregon
did not meet in regular session in 2006, and these states have not enacted legislative
responses to Kelo, although bills are pre-filed in both Montana and North Dakota,
and in Arkansas the state has commissioned a study of the use of eminent domain.
See The Castle Coalition, Legislative Action since Kelo, Nov. 29, 2006, available at
http://www.castlecoalition.org/pdf/publications/State-Summary-Publication.pdf.  The
Castle Coalition web page also includes an up to date list of legislative initiatives. See
The Castle Coalition, State Legislative Actions, http://maps.castlecoalition.org/legisla-
tion.html (last visited Mar. 25, 2007).  In Texas, although the legislature was not sitting
in regular session, a special session had been called at the time Kelo was decided, and
the legislature added takings reform to the agenda of the special session and passed
S.B. 7. See The Castle Coalition, Legislative Action since Kelo, supra.
100. See, e.g., 2006 Ga. Laws 444.
101. Id.
102. See supra note 20 for a list of eminent domain reforms. R
103. See, e.g., H.F. 2351, 81st Gen. Assem. (Iowa 2006) (requiring that the con-
demning authority establish that a property is blighted by clear and convincing evi-
dence and also imposing additional procedural hurdles to promoting administrative
transparency).
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lem.104  At the same time, however, virtually every state adopting
eminent domain restrictions has included one or more exceptions
to these restrictions, primarily for condemnations aimed at reduc-
ing or eliminating blight.105  The combination of these broad
prohibitions and blight-based exceptions renders the statutes both
less effective and more problematic than legislatures might have
predicted.
A. Limitations on the Uses of Condemned Property
The particular mechanics of limiting the use of eminent domain
for economic development purposes or transfer to private parties
vary among the states.  Most of the states employ language that
specifically outlaws the use of eminent domain for these purposes.
For example, Senate Bill 68 in Alabama states that: “Notwithstand-
ing any other provision of law, a municipality or county may not
condemn property for the purposes of private retail, office, com-
mercial, industrial, or residential development; or primarily for en-
hancement of tax revenue; or for transfer to a person,
nongovernmental entity, public/private partnership, corporation,
or other business entity.”106  Similarly, Senate Bill 323 in Kansas
prohibits the “taking of private property by eminent domain for
the purpose of selling, leasing or otherwise transferring such prop-
erty to any private entity.”107
Other states define the type of projects that can appropriately be
classified as public use projects, and omit, either expressly or by
implication, economic development or transfer to private entities
from the list.  For example, in House Bill 1313 from Georgia, the
legislature approved an amendment to Title 36 of the Georgia
Code, prescribing that “[a]ny exercise of the power of eminent do-
main . . . must: (1) be for a public use.”108  House Bill 1313 then
defines public use by reference to a list of permissible uses and this
prohibition: “The public benefit of economic development shall not
constitute a public use.”109  House Bill 1313 further defines eco-
nomic development as:
104. See, e.g., S.B. 167, 126th Gen. Assem. (Ohio 2005) (imposing a moratorium on
the use of eminent domain in areas that were not blighted and creating a task force to
study the use of eminent domain in the state).
105. See infra note 112 for a list of states including exceptions to their eminent
domain reforms.
106. 2006 Ala. Laws 584.
107. 2006 Kan. Sess. Laws 192.
108. 2006 Ga. Laws 444, § 22.
109. Id. § 3.
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any economic activity to increase tax revenue, tax base, or em-
ployment or improve general economic health, when the activity
does not result in: (A) Transfer of the land to public ownership;
(B) Transfer of the property to a private entity that is a public
utility; (C) Lease of the property to private entities that occupy
an incidental area within a public project; or (D) The remedy of
blight.110
Similarly, Tennessee S.B. 3296 contains a provision stating that
eminent domain can only be exercised to effectuate a public use
and then states that private benefit resulting from private economic
development such as increased tax revenue or increased employ-
ment does not qualify as a public use.111
B. Exceptions for the Eradication of Blight
Of the thirty-four states that have enacted eminent domain re-
form in the wake of Kelo, twenty-three states (more than sixty per-
cent) have explicitly excluded from their prohibitions the exercise
of eminent domain intended to address or eradicate blight.112  At
the same time, these states have uniformly adopted language limit-
ing the exception in an attempt to preclude the exception from
swallowing the rule.
The most common method by which states have limited the
scope of the blight exception has been to provide a detailed, spe-
cific definition of the term.  Alabama, for instance, changed the
definition of blight in its post-Kelo legislation to narrow the cir-
cumstances in which the government can use this classification to
justify the exercise of eminent domain.113  Before Kelo, Alabama
Code Section 24-2-2(a) stated that property could be condemned
as blighted for reasons such as “excessive land coverage,” “faulty
layout,” or “other factors.”114  Alabama was the first state to enact
legislation in response to Kelo, but this version of the state re-
sponse (Senate Bill 68) included a blight exception without defin-
ing the term blight.  The next year, Alabama House Bill 654
110. Id.
111. 2006 Tenn. Pub. Acts 863, § 1.
112. The states that included exceptions to their eminent domain reform are Ari-
zona, Alabama, Colorado, Georgia, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisi-
ana, Maine, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, North Carolina, Ohio, Oregon,
Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Texas, Vermont, West Virginia, and Wisconsin. See
The Castle Coalition, Legislative Action since Kelo, supra note 99 (giving links to all R
post-Kelo reforms).
113. ALA. CODE § 24-2-2(a)(2), (b) (LexisNexis 2007).
114. Id. § 24-2-2(a).
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revisited the issue, prescribing specific and limiting factors that
must be established before property can be condemned as
blighted.115  The new definition includes a precise list of the condi-
tions that a property must meet before it can be condemned as
blighted, and these conditions essentially require the property to
be neglected, run-down, or so unsanitary as to present a health haz-
ard or otherwise be unfit for human habitation.116  Virtually every
state that permits a blight exception to its restrictions on the use of
eminent domain for economic development has created definitions
of blight similar to Alabama’s.117
While the definitions of blight differ slightly from state to state,
all of the legislation broadly concerns three main factors: (1) lack
of structural integrity; (2) presence of a health hazard; and (3) lack
of suitability for human habitation.  In addition, a few states con-
sider the presence of a high level of crime in deciding if an area is
blighted.  For example, in Georgia, “repeated illegal activity” on
property is considered to be an indication of blight.118  Similarly, in
Wisconsin, property can be considered to be blighted if the crime
rate on the property is at least three times as high as the average
crime rate in the city in which the property is located.119
C. Procedural Constraints on the Determination of Blight
A few states have adopted heightened new procedural require-
ments that place a substantial burden on the governmental entity
seeking to condemn property in order to eradicate blight.120  For
example, Colorado House Bill 1411 imposes a higher standard of
proof on condemnations intended to eliminate blight than is appli-
cable to the use of eminent domain for other purposes.121  If a tak-
ing is intended to eradicate blight, the condemning authority must
show by clear and convincing evidence that the taking is necessary
to eradicate blight.122  For all other types of takings, the condemn-
ing authority must only demonstrate by a preponderance of the
115. H.B. 654, Reg. Sess., 2006 Ala. Laws 584.
116. Id.
117. See supra note 112; see, e.g., S.B. 3086, 94th Gen. Assem. (Ill. 2006) (limiting R
use of eminent domain for private development unless the area is blighted).
118. GA. CODE ANN. § 22-1-1(a)(A)(V) (2007).
119. 2006 Wis. Sess. Laws 233.
120. Notable among these are Colorado (H.B. 1411), Missouri (H.B. 1944), West
Virginia (H.B. 4048), and Wisconsin (A.B. 657).
121. H.B. 1411, 65th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Colo. 2006).
122. Id.
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evidence that the taking in question is necessary.123  Other states
require a parcel-by-parcel determination of blight, precluding the
exercise of eminent domain unless a preponderance of the proper-
ties in the targeted area satisfy the criteria.124  West Virginia pro-
hibits a municipal authority from condemning non-blighted
property in a blighted area unless it satisfies several conditions.125
In essence, the city must demonstrate that the redevelopment pro-
ject cannot proceed without the challenged condemnation, and that
there is no practical alternative to the condemnation of the
blighted property.126  Many particular alternatives are enumerated,
such as incorporation of the existing property into the redevelop-
ment plan and modification of the redevelopment plan such that
the existing property will not be included.127  Finally, Wisconsin
Assembly Bill 657 requires that before condemning property, the
condemning authority must provide: (1) a statement of the scope of
the redevelopment plan; (2) a legal description of the redevelop-
ment area; (3) the purpose of the condemnation; and (4) a finding
that the property is blighted and the reasons for the finding.128
Overall, the post-Kelo eminent domain statutes overwhelmingly
share two characteristics: they limit the use of eminent domain to
transfer private property from one owner to another for economic
development purposes and they make exceptions to that prohibi-
tion for the eradication of blight.  These two components, taken
together, are unlikely to meaningfully limit the ability of state and
local governments to pursue urban revitalization projects.  They
are very likely, however, to channel such projects in ways that
make them less effective, less efficient, and dramatically less fair.
IV. URBAN REVITALIZATION AND EMINENT DOMAIN
To understand why the various legislative responses are unlikely
to constrain state and local governments from pursuing urban revi-
123. Id.
124. See, e.g., H.B. 1944, 93d Gen. Assem., 2d Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2006) (creating MO.
REV. STAT. § 523.274(1) (2006), which states: “Where eminent domain authority is
based upon a determination that a defined area is blighted, the condemning authority
shall individually consider each parcel of property in the defined area with regard to
whether the property meets the relevant statutory definition of blight.  If the con-
demning authority finds a preponderance of the defined redevelopment area is
blighted, it may proceed with condemnation of any parcels in such area.”).
125. W. VA. CODE § 16-18-6a(b) (2006).
126. Id.
127. Id. § 16-18-6a(b)(4)-(8).
128. A.B. 657, 2005-2006 Assem., Biennial Sess. (Wis. 2006) (creating WIS. STAT.
§ 32.03(6)(c) (2006)).
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talization using eminent domain, we must first examine the impe-
tus toward urban revitalization and the essential role eminent
domain plays in any comprehensive revitalization plan.
The first wave of urban revitalization in the United States arose
out of a growing recognition in the 1940s that American cities had
“drifted into a situation, both physically and financially, that [was]
becoming intolerable . . . . [The plight of the cities was] becoming
progressively worse.”129  The response to this problem was focused
almost entirely on slum removal and eradication of blight in resi-
dential areas for two main reasons.  First, while the symptoms of
urban distress were multitudinous and far-reaching (such as stag-
nating or declining commercial and industrial tax bases, suburban
out-migration, and aging public infrastructure), the primary cause
of these symptoms was widely perceived to be the concentration of
extremely poor residents in substandard, blighted, and densely
built housing, otherwise known as slums.  Second, the public per-
ception of the appropriate reach of the state’s police power was
much more limited in the 1940s than it is today.  In that era, just a
few decades after Lochner v. New York,130 the possibility that the
federal government would become involved in a broad-based and
expensive scheme to improve the general economic and social well-
being of the nation’s cities was essentially untenable.131  Thus, the
federal urban renewal program adopted in 1949 was specifically de-
signed to empower local governments to condemn broad swaths of
blighted residential property to eliminate health and safety
problems, and to subsidize redevelopment of safer, healthier resi-
dential property in its place.132
Planners felt from the beginning that the focus on residential re-
development was short-sighted and destined to fail.  As one plan-
ner warned,
129. Ashley A. Foard & Hilbert Fefferman, Federal Urban Renewal Legislation, in
URBAN RENEWAL, THE RECORD AND THE CONTROVERSY 71, 72-73 (James Q. Wilson
ed., 1966) (quoting from GUY GREER & ALVIN H. HANSEN, URBAN REDEVELOP-
MENT AND HOUSING (Nat’l Planning Ass’n 1941)).
130. 198 U.S. 45 (1905)
131. See, e.g., id. at 106 (noting that the Taft Subcommittee Report on Postwar
Housing, issued Aug. 1, 1945, stated that “[t]he Subcommittee is not convinced that
the federal government should embark upon a general program of aid to cities look-
ing to their rebuilding in more attractive and economical patterns”).
132. See Wilton S. Sogg & Warren Wertheimer, Legal and Governmental Issues in
Urban Renewal, 72 HARV. L. REV. 504 (1959), reprinted in URBAN RENEWAL, supra
note 129, at 126, 128-32 (explaining the scope and operation of the federal urban
renewal program).
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a costly mistake will be made if urban redevelopment be con-
ceived of as the re-planning and rebuilding of slum areas only or
rebuilding for housing only . . . . [U]nless the legislation, plan-
ning and administration be understood to be for all kinds of
blighted areas for all classes of urban uses, the process will not
produce sound and stable results.133
Today most commentators agree that these concerns were pre-
scient.134  While there is no general consensus that the urban re-
newal program was a complete failure,135 there is widespread
agreement that the costs of the program were substantial in com-
parison to the benefits, and that the focus on eradicating blight and
slums was a primary reason for its poor performance.136  In particu-
lar, as a consequence of urban renewal in the 1950s and 1960s,
large numbers of poor minority residents were displaced from mar-
ginal or substandard housing.137  As one onlooker observed,
[I]t is not because of misunderstanding but because of suffering
that some have called urban renewal “urban removal” or “Ne-
gro removal.” Since our whole pattern of discrimination has
forced Negroes and Puerto Ricans into slums and ghettos, they
find themselves living in precisely those areas which the city
designates as blighted and suitable for urban renewal.138
133. Foard & Fefferman, supra note 129, at 105 (quoting from the statement of R
Seward H. Mott, Director of the Urban Land Institute).
134. As Professor Garnett has said, “[c]ritiques of the largely discredited urban re-
newal experiment abound.”  Garnett, supra note 33, at 934, 953 n.119 (collecting cites
of the most prominent critiques).
135. Compare Martin Anderson, The Federal Bulldozer, in URBAN RENEWAL,
supra note 129, at 491-95 (arguing that the entire concept of public involvement with
urban redevelopment is flawed), with HERBERT J. GANS, PEOPLE AND PLANS: ESSAYS
ON URBAN PROBLEMS AND SOLUTIONS 260-77 (1968) (defending the concept of pub-
licly administered redevelopment and suggesting improvements).
136. See, e.g., GANS, supra note 135, at 274 (“This massive program has much to R
recommend it, but we must clearly understand that moving the low-income popula-
tion out of the slums would not eliminate poverty or the other problems that stem
from it . . . . What poor people need most is decent incomes, proper jobs, better
schools, and freedom from racial and class discrimination.”).
137. See Chester Hartman, The Housing of Relocated Families, in URBAN RE-
NEWAL, supra note 129, at 293, 311 (“Every study of racially mixed relocation areas in
which the effects of relocation are analyzed separately for white and nonwhite house-
holds indicates that the effects of discrimination make decent relocation housing more
difficult and expensive to obtain for non-whites and force them to pay high rents,
even for poor housing.”); see also BERNARD J. FRIEDEN & LYNNE B. SAGALYN,
DOWNTOWN, INC.: HOW AMERICA REBUILDS CITIES 29-30 (1989); Anderson, supra
note 134, at 494-95 (noting that between 1950 and 1960 the urban renewal program
tore down 126,000 housing units and built only 28,000 new units).
138. Arthur R. Simon, New Yorkers Without a Voice: A Tragedy of Urban Renewal,
THE ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Apr. 1966, at 54 (explaining the impacts of New York
City’s redevelopment plans for the Lower East Side in 1961).
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Often, these minority families were not even relocated by the
program, but were left to find whatever substitute housing they
could.139  Those that were relocated often found themselves in
huge and ultimately failed housing projects that segregated the
poor from the rest of the city and concentrated the problems asso-
ciated with poverty in a new form of urban ghetto.140  The redevel-
opment in the cleared areas was often dedicated to the
construction of middle- and upper-income housing141 with no effort
to maintain diversity and dynamic social interaction in the neigh-
borhood.142  Worse, due to a failure of planning and foresight,
many of the urban renewal areas lay vacant and deserted for years
after the low-income residents were forced out.143
A second wave of urban revitalization grew out of the failures of
the urban renewal program and the shift of federal financial input
from urban renewal grants to Community Development Block
Grants (“CDBGs”).  In addition to CDBGs, state and local gov-
ernments turned to innovative tax and subsidy strategies to en-
courage urban revitalization.144  In this incarnation of urban
revitalization, freed from the yoke of the urban renewal limita-
tions, the focus was forward-looking, not backward, and the vision
encompassed the whole city—not just the deteriorating or substan-
dard residential areas targeted by urban renewal.  Rather than ask
139. See Kelo, 545 U.S. 469, 521 (2005) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (citing FRIEDAN &
SAGALAYN, supra note 137, at 17, 28) (“Of all the families displaced by urban renewal R
from 1949 through 1963, 63 percent of those whose race was known were nonwhite,
and of these families, 56 percent of nonwhites and 38 percent of whites had incomes
low enough to qualify for public housing, which, however, was seldom available to
them.”); see also Lawrence C. Christy & Peter W. Coogan, Note, Family Relocation in
Urban Renewal, 82 HARV. L. REV. 864, 872-73 (1969).
140. DOUGLAS S. MASSEY & NANCY A. DENTON, AMERICAN APARTHEID 57
(1993) (“[B]y 1970, after two decades of urban renewal, public housing projects in
most large cities became black reservations, highly segregated from the rest of society
and characterized by extreme social isolation.”); see also Shilesh Muralidhara, Defi-
ciencies of the Low-Income Housing Tax Credit in Targeting the Lowest-Income
Households and in Promoting Concentrated Poverty and Segregation, 24 LAW & INEQ.
353, 355 (2006).
141. For example, Stuyvesant Town and Peter Cooper Village were built on eradi-
cated slums as housing for middle-class white families of returning World War II vet-
erans. See Charles V. Bagli & Janny Scott, Housing Complex of 110 Buildings for Sale
in City, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 30, 2006, at A1.
142. JANE JACOBS, THE DEATH AND LIFE OF GREAT AMERICAN CITIES 270 (1961).
143. Garnett, supra note 33, at 953-55. R
144. See Edward T. Rogowsky et al., New York City’s Outer Borough Development
Strategy, in URBAN REVITALIZATION: POLICIES & PROGRAMS 69, 69-99 (Fritz W.
Wagner, Timothy E. Joder & Anthony J. Mumphrey, Jr. eds., 1995) (describing the
planning and financing aspects of several urban revitalization projects from the post
urban renewal era).
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how a city could react to the emergence of blight and urban de-
cline, revitalization proponents sought to harness the power of
comprehensive planning to help guide the future development of
cities, so that they would not find themselves having “drifted” into
a state of decline and deterioration from which it is hard to re-
cover.145  Thus, this version of urban revitalization was about
proactive engagement by local governments in the life and future
of cities.
As a consequence of this broader proactive approach, urban re-
vitalization plans more often encompassed areas of cities inhabited
by middle-class, non-minority citizens and the planning process in-
corporated opportunities for public participation.146  Even success-
ful urban revitalization projects met some degree of resistance,
which found its outlet in the media, the political process, and the
courts.147  As noted above, federal and state constitutional chal-
lenges generally failed until the emergence of the recent trend
(which is still relatively limited) by state courts to restrict the scope
of their own constitutions’ public use clause.148  As previously men-
tioned, however, the resistance has gained a political foothold, and,
as a result of the legislative responses to Kelo, the urban revitaliza-
tion movement is now at a crossroads.149
V. URBAN REVITALIZATION IN A POST-KELO WORLD
It remains to be seen what form the urban revitalization move-
ment will take in the post-Kelo world.  Several things, however,
seem clear.  First, state and local governments are unlikely to for-
sake their obligations to plan for the growth and revitalization of
economically challenged urban environments.  Second, implement-
ing the fruits of this planning will necessarily entail the exercise of
eminent domain.  Third, unless the post-Kelo restrictions on the
use of eminent domain are lifted, urban revitalization projects of
145. See, e.g., Louis K. Lowenstein & Dorn C. McGrath, Jr., The Planning Impera-
tive in America’s Future, 405 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 15, 17 (1973)
(describing the movement of the National Planning Board toward a more comprehen-
sive plan of urban land use).
146. See WILLIAM C. JOHNSON, THE POLITICS OF URBAN PLANNING 85-97 (1989)
(discussing citizen participation in urban planning).
147. See, e.g., id. at 4-5 (describing the successful effort by citizens of San Diego to
pass a ballot initiative prohibiting future development of a 52,000-acre urbanization
zone without specific voter approval).
148. See supra notes 93-128 and accompanying text. R
149. See supra notes 93-105 and accompanying text. R
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the future are likely to be less efficient, less effective, and much
less fair than their pre-Kelo counterparts.
A. The Lasting Allure of Urban Revitalization
Urban planning and, concomitantly, urban revitalization are
here to stay.  After decades of declining population, there is new
evidence that cities are on the rebound.150  This trend, however, is
not uniform.  Population trends indicate that urban areas in the
West and the sunbelt will experience continued high growth rates,
while older rust belt cities will continue to struggle against popula-
tion loss.151  Inner cities, after years of decline due to suburban
flight, sprawl, and industrial migration, are currently being repopu-
lated as young, professional suburbanites with financial clout move
back to the city and are joined by the empty nesters of the baby
boom generation.152  City planning departments are unlikely to sit
by passively as this rejuvenation occurs.  Similarly, smaller cities
and towns have suffered from lost industrial and commercial uses
over the last two decades,153 and these communities will have to
undertake development initiatives if they are to survive.  The suc-
cesses of public/private partnership redevelopment schemes in cit-
ies throughout the United States provides alluring evidence to
declining cities that they need not accept the hand that the free
market has dealt them.154
150. See Edward L. Glaeser & Jesse M. Shapiro, City Growth & the 2000 Census:
Which Places Grew, and Why, BROOKINGS INST. SURVEY SERIES, 2001, at 7 (asserting
that the median growth rate for cities in the 1990s was more than double the median
growth in the 1980s).
151. Edward L. Glaeser & Jesse M. Shapiro, Is There a New Urbanism?  The
Growth of U.S. Cities in the 1990s, HARV. INST. ECON. RES., June 2001, at 23, available
at http://ssrn.com/abstract=274379.
152. See WILLIAM H. HUDNUT III, CITIES ON THE REBOUND: A VISION FOR UR-
BAN AMERICA 116-17 (1998) (stating that empty nesters and twenty-somethings
“find[ ] that urban living fits their lifestyles,” creating a possible rebirth of the urban
housing market); U.S. Census Bureau, Population Trends in Metropolitan Areas and
Central Cities (1990) (providing detailed statistics evidencing population growth in
metropolitan areas throughout the United States and in central cities in the West and
the South).
153. See Sam Staley, Ground Zero in Urban Decline, REASON MAG., Nov. 2001, at
2 (describing the effects of suburban migration and loss of industry on Cincinnati and
suggesting that the city serves as a metaphor for the future of America’s small cities);
see also DENNIS R. JUDD & TODD SWANSTROM, CITY POLITICS: PRIVATE POWER AND
PUBLIC POLICY 205-11, 348-51 (2004) (describing the decline of industrial cities, such
as St. Louis and Cleveland, and the recovery of some cities during the 1990s).
154. There is no shortage of revitalization success stories to tempt cities to embark
on public/private partnership planned redevelopments. See JUDD & SWANSTROM,
supra note 152, at 362-63 (detailing the extraordinary and unanticipated success of
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To accomplish this revitalization, local governments have in-
creasingly turned to public/private partnerships, in which the city
collaborates with one or more private developers to undertake a
planned mixed-use development suited to a particular area of the
city.155  These partnerships are funded by a variety of mechanisms,
including Business Improvement Districts, municipal bonds, tax in-
centives, tax increment financing, and private investment.156  Over-
all, this model of redevelopment has been much more successful
than its predecessor, urban renewal.157
Boston’s Quincy Market); see also Kristen Hoffman, Note, Waterfront Development
as an Urban Revitalization Tool: Boston’s Waterfront Redevelopment Plan, 23 HARV.
ENVTL. L. REV. 471, 524-27 (1999) (discussing Baltimore’s successful revitalization).
155. See Fritz W. Wagner, Timothy E. Jader & Anthony J. Mumphrey, Jr., Intro-
duction to URBAN REVITALIZATION: POLICIES AND PROGRAMS, supra note 144, at ix, R
xiv (noting that “[v]irtually all of the successful revitalization projects featured an
emphasis on creating partnerships between the public and private sectors.  Perhaps no
other single strategy has been as critical to the success of redevelopment projects”);
see also ROBERTH G. DREHER, & JOHN D. ECHEVERRIA, KELO’S UNANSWERED
QUESTIONS: THE POLICY DEBATE OVER THE USE OF EMINENT DOMAIN FOR ECO-
NOMIC DEVELOPMENT (2006) (providing many examples of successful redevelopment
projects driven by public/private partnerships and creative use of government financ-
ing schemes such as low interest loans); FRITZ W. WAGNER, TIMOTHY E. JODER &
ANTHONY J. MUMPHREY, JR., MANAGING CAPITAL RESOURCES FOR CENTRAL CITY
REVITALIZATION 19-27 (2000) (providing case studies of successful public/private
partnerships for urban revitalization by examining sixteen central city neighborhoods
in four large American cities: Atlanta, Georgia; Minneapolis, Minnesota; New Orle-
ans, Louisiana; Portland, Oregon); Peter W. Salsich, Jr., Privatization and Democrati-
zation – Reflections on the Power of Eminent Domain, 50 ST. LOUIS U.  L.J. 751, 751
(2006) (describing the trend toward public/private partnerships and creative public
financing of redevelopment projects).
156. For examples of successful uses of these strategies to revitalize declining urban
areas such as Times Square in New York City, see Wendell E. Prichett, Beyond Kelo:
Thinking About Urban Development in the 21st Century, 22 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 895,
919-32  (2006).  For an interesting discussion of New York’s experience with creative
public involvement in revitalization, see William J. Stern, State Capitalism, New York
Style, CITY J., Summer 1994.
157. The Downtown Waterfront urban renewal district in Portland, Oregon is a
good example of the power of tax increment financing and progressive planning in
accomplishing urban revitalization.  Initiated in 1974, the Portland Downtown Water-
front district is considered among the most successful urban revitalization projects of
its era.  Since its inception, more than $1.5 billion in private and public funding has
been invested in the waterfront revitalization project, resulting in the creation of a
vibrant and diverse mix of retail, office, commercial, and residential uses in a previ-
ously underutilized area, and generating an estimated 30,000 new jobs. See Arthur C.
Nelson with Jeffrey H. Milgroom, Regional Growth Management and Central-City Vi-
tality: Comparing Development Patterns in Atlanta, Georgia, and Portland, Oregon, in
URBAN REVITALIZATION: POLICIES AND PROGRAMS, supra note 144, at 1, 27-29. R
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B. The Importance of Eminent Domain to
Successful Revitalization
The power of eminent domain is indispensable to effective and
efficient urban revitalization.158  If local governments remain intent
on planning for the economic health of their communities, then
they will continue to rely on their eminent domain powers to effec-
tuate the goals of their comprehensive plans.
Effective urban revitalization through public/private partner-
ships often entails the development of large mixed-use projects
that require a lot of land to implement.159  Most of the property
needed to pursue these development projects can be, and is, ac-
quired through voluntary purchase agreements.160  In the event
some (or even one) landowner in the redevelopment area refuses
to negotiate the sale of her property, however, the project would
not be able to move forward without the use of eminent domain.
Professor Merrill explains the obstacles that a noncompetitive mar-
ket (what he terms a “thin market”) creates for the acquisition of
tracts needed for redevelopment.161  In essence, the identification
of a particular tract of land necessary to permit completion of a
large-scale project permits the owner of that parcel or parcels to
command a higher price for the property than she would be able to
in a fully competitive market (a “thick market”).162  If her demands
are not met she can, essentially, veto the entire project unless the
developer can use eminent domain to force the transfer at the price
that would have prevailed in an actually competitive market.
Critics of the use of eminent domain for economic development
suggest that this power is not really necessary because some
projects have been successfully undertaken without the use of emi-
nent domain.163  This criticism is unpersuasive for three reasons.
First, while some of the projects cited are large and multi-faceted,
most tend to be relatively small and uni-dimensional compared to
158. For a thorough discussion of the importance of the power of eminent domain
to efficient urban redevelopment, see generally Thomas Merrill, supra note 21. Many
of the points made in this section were first made in this seminal work.
159. See generally WAGNER, JODER & MUMPHREY, supra note 155. R
160. Indeed, even in the City of New London, most of the land needed for the
revitalization project was purchased through voluntary transactions. See Kelo v. City
of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 472 (2005).
161. See Merrill, supra note 21, at 74-77. R
162. Id. at 75-76.
163. See THE CASTLE COALITION, MYTHS AND REALITIES OF EMINENT DOMAIN
ABUSE 9-12 (June 2006), available at http://www.castlecoalition.org/pdf/publications/
CC_Myths_Reality%20Final.pdf (providing examples of public and private develop-
ment projects undertaken without the use of eminent domain).
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complex urban revitalization projects.164  Second, most of the
projects referred to involve private developers that can rely on se-
cret buying agents to avoid strategic bargaining by the landowners.
Government actors are precluded from conducting the business of
the city in private and under a cloak of secrecy, and therefore are
not well situated to accumulate large tracts of land without the
power of eminent domain.165  Finally, the fact that these projects
did not actually require the use of eminent domain does not estab-
lish that they did not rely on the threat of eminent domain.166  As
noted above, most of the transfers of property rights in urban revi-
talization projects are also voluntary, but it is generally conceded
that the voluntary transfers are aided by the background threat of
eminent domain.
C. The Consequences of Kelo
As mentioned above, thirty-four states have already adopted leg-
islation restricting the use of eminent domain for economic devel-
opment, and others are likely to follow suit.167  None of the
statutes, however, will completely preclude governments from con-
demning private property in service of urban revitalization
schemes, even when the primary purpose of the plan is to foster
economic development.  Rather, the legislation will simply result in
urban revitalization projects that are conceived and implemented
to comply with the statutory restrictions.  In many ways, these stat-
utes reintroduce into urban revitalization many of the pitfalls of
the urban renewal program.  As a result, urban revitalization in the
post-Kelo world is likely to be less efficient, less effective, and
much less fair than it has the potential to be.
Urban revitalization projects are likely to be less efficient in the
future because planners will be compelled to engage in backward-
looking planning, as opposed to proactive planning.  Because most
of the statutes limit revitalization projects to those that address
164. Id.
165. See Daniel B. Kelly, The “Public Use” Requirement in Eminent Domain Law:
A Rationale Based on Secret Purchases and Private Influence, 92 CORNELL L. REV. 1,
9-14 (2006) (explaining the power of the secret buying agent for private accumulation
of large parcels, and distinguishing governmental attempts to accumulate large tracts).
166. See, e.g., Benjamin Powell, Eminent Domain Roulette, INVESTOR’S BUS.
DAILY, May 30, 2006, available at http://www.independent.org/newsroom/article.asp?
id=1735 (showing an example of how the threat of eminent domain was used in Her-
cules, California).
167. See supra note 20 for a list of states that have enacted legislation restricting R
the use of eminent domain.
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blight, planners will be precluded from choosing the best, most effi-
cient area for urban revitalization projects.  Instead, projects will
have to be made to “work” in blighted areas that might be poorly
suited for them.  In Freeport, Texas, for example, the proposed ec-
onomic development project relies on the marina as its anchor.168
While much of the neighborhood surrounding the riverfront was
found to be severely or moderately blighted,169 it might not be to
the degree and extent of blight sufficient to satisfy the new Texas
statute.170  If the FEDC could not negotiate voluntary transfers
from every single landowner on the waterfront, the revitalization
project would have to be moved to a less ideal location and restruc-
tured as a less ideal project or simply abandoned.171  If it were
moved, it would likely cost more per dollar of generated public
benefit and generate less economic benefit overall.172  Moreover,
because many post-Kelo reform statutes require local governments
to wait until a city area is in substantial decline before engaging in
revitalization projects, it is likely to be more difficult or at least
more costly to involve private developers in the revitalization
process.
Finally, because the post-Kelo statutes generally prohibit the use
of eminent domain for economic development only if the property
is to be transferred to a private owner,173 city governments may
move into the business of running retail and commercial enter-
prises in the future to ensure that they can fully implement pro-
posed development projects.  If a development corporation is
successful in negotiating voluntary buyouts of all but a few parcels
necessary to a comprehensive revitalization project, the redevelop-
ing authority may decide to retain the holdout properties in public
ownership to ensure that they can use their newly limited eminent
domain powers to facilitate the revitalization.  Under this scenario,
the government entity would either operate one portion of the re-
vitalization plan as a publicly owned enterprise or lease its interest
out for private management.  In fact, the city of Freeport, Texas,
168. See Freeport Master Plan, supra note 3, at 26. R
169. See id. at 13.
170. The Texas statute prohibits the use of eminent domain for economic develop-
ment purposes unless the economic development purpose is secondary to municipal
actions taken for the purpose of eliminating an existing affirmative harm to society
caused by a slum or blighted area. See TEX. CODE ANN. § 2206.001(b)(3) (2005).
171. See Freeport Master Plan, supra note 3, at 52. R
172. See id. at 76, 83.
173. See, e.g., COLO. REV STAT. § 31-25-105.5 (2005) (stating that private property
acquired by eminent domain cannot be subsequently transferred to a private party
unless the property is blighted or in a blighted area).
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appears to have decided to go into the marina business, rather than
continue to defend its embattled revitalization project under the
post-Kelo Texas statute.174
Thus, statutes that permit eminent domain as long as the govern-
ment retains title to the condemned property are likely to result in
more publicly operated enterprises within public/private redevel-
opment projects.  Economic theory and empirical studies suggest
that these publicly operated enterprises are likely to be less effi-
ciently operated than their private counterparts.175
Most importantly, urban revitalization in the post-Kelo world is
likely to be tragically unfair.176  The omnipresent blight exception
in the post-Kelo statutes revives the worst aspect of the urban re-
newal programs of the past—the imposition of the costs of revitali-
zation on poor, minority communities for the benefit of middle-
and upper-class citizens.  Urban renewal took an enormous toll on
poor minority communities in the 1940s through the 1960s, when
there was little concerted public opposition.177  Under the broad
conception of public use and the deference to legislative judgments
articulated in Berman and Midkiff, there was at least the potential
to shift the impacts of urban revitalization beyond blighted com-
munities and perhaps to distribute the burdens of urban revitaliza-
tion among the various demographic groups of the city.178  Not
174. See Velda Hunter, Freeport Might Become Landlord, FACTS, Nov. 11, 2006; see
also Velda Hunter, Freeport EDC Passes Marina Resolutions, FACTS, Aug. 27, 2006
(“The city is considering developing the project as a public marina, instead of a pri-
vate development, and letting someone else operate it, city officials have said.”).
175. See generally Mary M. Shirley & Patrick Walsh, Public vs. Private Ownership:
The Current State of the Debate (World Bank Policy Research Paper No. 2420, Jan.
2001) (reviewing the theoretical and empirical literature on public versus private own-
ership of economic enterprises and concluding that while economic theory suggests
that public ownership may be preferable to private ownership in some circumstances,
empirical studies establish that private or privatized firms consistently perform more
efficiently in most markets).
176. See David Barron, Op-Ed., Eminent Domain Is Dead! (Long Live Eminent
Domain!), BOSTON GLOBE, Apr. 16, 2006.
177. See Garnett, supra note 33, at 953-54 (detailing the effects of urban renewal on R
poor minority communities).
178. Indeed, many of the cases in which landowners have prevailed in state courts
involve urban revitalization projects that encompass middle-class landowners. See,
e.g., County of Wayne v. Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d 765 (Mich. 2004) (overruling
Poletown Neighborhood Council v. Detroit, 304 N.W.2d 455 (Mich. 1981) and invali-
dating a planned condemnation of non-blighted parcels for economic development
purposes); see also City of Norwood v. Horney, 853 N.E.2d 1115, 1144 (Ohio 2006)
(invalidating under the Ohio Constitution, the proposed condemnation of private
property defined as deteriorating but not blighted; the property at issue was found to
be “generally in good condition” and the owners were not delinquent in paying their
property taxes, nor was there any suggestion that the area was invested with vermin
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only did this permit the local governments to design the most ap-
propriate revitalization scheme for the city, but it also fostered
public participation in the planning process.179  After all, if every-
one’s property was equally available for condemnation-backed re-
vitalization, everyone had an interest in making sure revitalization
plans were really worthwhile and narrowly tailored.180
Under the most prevalent statutory responses to Kelo, however,
revitalizing cities must concentrate their efforts on areas that meet
strictly drawn definitions of blight.  In doing so, they will, no doubt,
disproportionately impact the poor and minority members of the
community, much like the discredited urban renewal movement of
the past.  Returning to an era of blight eradication as a pretext for
urban revitalization will likely increase the probability that govern-
ments will engage in this sort of condemnation and decrease the
political power of the landowners to resist.  The post-Kelo legisla-
tive responses have essentially codified the worst aspects of the
mid century urban renewal movement.
or subject to high crime rates, or otherwise posed “an impermissible risk to the larger
community”).
179. See National Building Museum, Metropolitan Perspectives: Smart Growth &
Choices for Change (2000), http://www.nbm.org/Exhibits/past/2000_1996/Metropoli-
tan_Perspectives_Script.html.
180. See Cohen, supra note 93, at 549 (discussing the potential oppression that can
result from the concentration of potential condemnations on marginalized minority
groups during the urban renewal process, but not acknowledging the theoretical polit-
ical safeguards that result in distributing the risk of eminent domain to more main-
stream landowners).  Both the oppression of marginalized landowners, however, and
the political protection of more mainstream landowners have been evidenced in the
past sixty years—the first by the ill-conceived urban renewal program and the second
by the legislative response to Kelo. See supra notes 129-143. R
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